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Dictatorship-era Crimes and
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Abstract
This article assesses the dramatic shift in Chilean Supreme Court juris-
prudence toward accountability for crimes committed during the dicta-
torship and sets it within the context of judicial reform and political
change. Chile’s experience has been identified as emblematic of delayed
justice, but an examination of key case law identifies the narrow scope
and instability of Supreme Court decision-making. The Court has been
uncharacteristically assertive in its application of human rights norms
yet vulnerable to external influences. The Chilean example underscores
the need for political leadership to address past violations in
post-conflict societies. Political inertia impeded justice claims and, as a
result, change required significant judicial innovation.
Keywords: gross human rights violations ^ impunity for violations ^
constitutional law ^ political transition ^ transitional justice ^
post-conflict societies ^ Supreme Court of Chile
1. Introduction
Chile has been the subject of significant attention by human rights scholars as
one among Southern Cone countries to experience a surge in prosecutions for
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crimes committed during the authoritarian regime. Previously, the country
had been studied as an example of constrained justice, illustrating the contro-
versial compromises entailed in transitions to democracy. The efforts of the
Chilean human rights community to secure the criminal responsibility of
human rights abusers from the 1973^90 era contributed to the emerging field
of transitional justice. But Pinochet’s iconic Amnesty Law maintained a firm
hold, and successive democratic governments prioritised truth processes over
prosecutions. A small number of military officers were convicted in the 1990s
for human rights abuses, and jurisprudential change in domestic courts prior
to Pinochet’s detention in London from 1998 to 2000 resulted in the indict-
ment of others.1 But in the immediate aftermath of the dictator’s release after
the UK Pinochet case,2 the courts failed to realise the government’s promises
of local justice. More recently, a resurgence of prosecutions against former se-
curity personnel has occurred, led by private actors pursuing court processes
and judges willing to convict individuals for dictatorship-era abuses. In fact,
more than 20 years after the formal end of the dictatorship, court dockets are
filled with past cases and hundreds of officials have been convicted for
human rights abuses.3 Renewed interest in the domestic Chilean experience
has accompanied this revival. Scholars have studied Chile as a leading example
of delayed accountability,4 whereby injustices have been addressed after the
democratic transition ended.5
These prosecutions represent a sea change. Yet efforts to explain the
surge threaten to overshadow weaknesses in human rights developments in
1 Hilbink, Judges Beyond Politics in Democracy and Dictatorship: Lessons from Chile (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 189^202; Requa, ‘The Bitter Transition’, in Burbach,The
Pinochet Affair: State Terrorism and Global Justice (London: Zed Books, 2003) at 85^9; and
Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Effect: Transnational Justice in the Age of Human Rights
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005) at 70^4.
2 Ibid.; Woodhouse, The Pinochet Case: A Legal and Constitutional Analysis (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2000); Davis (ed.), The Pinochet Case: Origins, Progress, and Implications (London:
Institute of Latin American Studies, 2003); Power, ‘Pinochet and the Uncertain Globalization
of Criminal Law’ (2007) 39 George Washington International Law Review 89; and Moghalu,
Global Justice: The Politics of War Crimes Trials (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International,
2006).
3 Human Rights Observatory, ‘Latest Human Rights Case Statistics’ (Santiago: Universidad
Diego Portales, 2011), available at: http://www.icso.cl/observatorio-derechos-humanos/cifras-
causas-case-statistics [last accessed 23 November 2011].
4 Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin,Transforming Latin America:The International and Domestic Origins
of Change (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005); Collins, Post-Transitional Justice:
Human Rights Trials in Chile and El Salvador (University Park: Pennsylvania State University
Press, 2010); Huneeus, ‘Judging from a Guilty Conscience: The Chilean Judiciary’s Human
Rights Turn’ (2009) 35 Law & Social Inquiry 99; and Skaar, Judicial Independence and Human
Rights in Latin America: Violations, Politics, and Prosecution (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2011).
5 The transition in Chile was complete after constitutional reforms in 2005 eliminated most of
the vestiges of authoritarian rule, if not before. See Collins, ‘Human Rights Trials in Chile
During and After the ‘‘Pinochet Years’’’ (2010) 4 International Journal of Transitional Justice 67
at 83. See also Heiss and Navia, ‘You Win Some, You Lose Some: Constitutional Reforms in
Chile’s Transition to Democracy’ (2007) 49 Latin American Politics and Society 163.
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Chile. This article assesses decision-making by the Chilean Supreme Court,
identifying its limitations and setting it in the context of judicial reform and
political change. Despite individual instances in which justice has been
achieved and the symbolic significance of multiple convictions, the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence in key ‘accountability case law’6çthat involving human
rights abuses from the authoritarian eraçhas been inconsistent and narrow in
scope. Lower courts are left without clear guidance on issues central to human
rights protection including the position of international law in the domestic
system and judge-made norms. Although these courts pioneered many of the
interpretive developments discussed in this article, unpredictability in Supreme
Court decision-making allows for contradictory rulings as well, increasing
the potential for variation in a system that does not require adherence to
precedent. Changeable sentencing practices further complicate what has been
characterised as a trend toward justice for past human rights violations.
Section 2 of the article examines significant cases that represent milestones
in Chilean accountability jurisprudence from 1990 to 2007. It argues that
Supreme Court approaches to international law, dictatorship-era law, retro-
spectivity and non-statutory principles are unstable. In Section 3, the case
law is viewed in light of judicial reform and political developments in Chile
and framed within the relevant judicial politics literature. The dramatic shift
in jurisprudence, from inertia at the start of the transition to activism7
post-transition, can be understood as the consequence of indirect internation-
al and domestic political pressure on a conservative judiciary with new-found
independence. The case law does, however, demonstrate an opportunity for
expansion of judicial autonomy, in conjunction with an intermittently matur-
ing judicial culture in Chile.8 Judge-made rules have been used inconsistently
to protect rights but, once established, they can be more readily invoked by
courts and human rights practitioners in other areas.
The conclusion in Section 4 considers the activity of political actors in rela-
tion to accountability trials. In short, political leaders are also responsible for
instability in this area. Even as successive governments denounced the
Amnesty Law on the international stage, the executive and legislature did
little to facilitate judicial resolution of human rights claims by, for example,
6 ‘Accountability case law’ is defined here as judgments involving claims of gross human rights
violations related to the authoritarian period; the article’s conception of accountability cen-
tres on retributive trials.
7 ‘Judicial activism’ in this article refers to protection of internationally recognised rights and a
marked distinction from the Supreme Court’s traditional approach to constitutional law. See
Dickson (ed.), Judicial Activism in Common Law Supreme Courts (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2008); and Holland (ed.), Judicial Activism in Comparative Perspective (Hampshire:
MacMillan, 1991).
8 On a ‘new constitutional orthodoxy’ in Latin America, see Couso, ‘The Transformation of
Constitutional Discourse and the Judicialization of Politics in Latin America’, in Couso,
Huneeus and Sieder (eds), Cultures of Legality: Judicialization and Political Activism in Latin
America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 158.
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revoking the law or reforming the criminal code to accommodate widespread
human rights violations. Prosecutions were impeded by this inertia and, as a
result, jurisprudential changeçtenuous as it isçrequired significant judicial
innovation. The conclusion thus makes a contribution to recent debate in tran-
sitional justice literature on delayed justice, suggesting that ongoing political
engagement on rights issues is a prerequisite for comprehensive accountability.
2. Milestones in Chilean Accountability Jurisprudence
This section identifies three main phases in Supreme Court accountability jur-
isprudence from1990 to 2007. In the early years of the transition, the majority
of the Supreme Court took a positivistic approach to the 1978 Amnesty Law9
and provisions of the criminal code, key barriers to accountability. The year
1998 marks a changing point in the jurisprudence, in which the Supreme
Court held that both domestic and international law required the investigation
of human rights abuses covered by the Amnesty Law. In subsequent years, in
the final phase, the Court developed varying creative doctrines to avoid the
application of amnesty and statute of limitations rules, allowing convictions
to be sustained. The judgments discussed here are notable for (i) a minimalistic
use of international law during most of the post-authoritarian period, with
domestic law adapted at times to incrementally align with international stand-
ards,10 followed by the direct recognition of universal rights in recent years;
(ii) the eventual identification of the authoritarian regime as illiberal but con-
tinued reliance by the Supreme Court on dictatorship-era law, including incon-
sistent treatment of the Amnesty Law; (iii) tension in regard to the
retrospectivity of human rights standards; and (iv) use of judge-made law to
support changes in the interpretation of constitutional and international law.
Significantly, decision-making in these casesçresulting in accountability for
human rights violationsçis exceptional when compared to results in cases
dealing with contemporary rights issues.11
9 Decree Law No 2.191 (18 April 1978). Article 1 provides: ‘Amnesty shall be granted to all indi-
viduals who committed criminal acts, whether as perpetrators, accomplices or accessories
after the fact, during the state of siege in force from September11,1973 to March10,1978, pro-
vided they are not currently subject to legal proceedings or have been already sentenced.’
[Author’s translation]
10 This trend has been identified in the UK context as well in relation to Article 2 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950,
213 UNTS 221, in UK courts, see Requa and Anthony, ‘Coroners, Controversial Deaths, and
Northern Ireland’s Past Conflict’ (2008) Public Law 443. In the context of obligations of
European Union membership, also in UK courts, see Allison, ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty,
Europe and the Economy of the Common Law’, in Andenas and Fairgrieve (eds), Liber
Amicorum in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley Volume II: Judicial Review in International
Perspective (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000).
11 Couso, ‘The Judicialization of Chilean Politics: The Rights Revolution That Never Was’, in
Sieder, Schjolden and Angell (eds), The Judicialization of Politics in Latin America (New York:
Palgrave MacMillan, 2005) 114.
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A. Phase I (1990^97): Vestiges of Authoritarianism
The 1990 Supreme Court decision in Insunza Bascun‹ a¤ n12 set the tone for the
first phase of accountability jurisprudence during the post-dictatorship era.
In joined cases, representing 70 disappearances, the petitioners challenged
the constitutionality of the application of the Amnesty Law by a military tribu-
nal. Rejecting the petition, the Supreme Court held that constitutional provi-
sions allowing for amnesty prevailed over criminal codes that required
investigations to be completed before a case could be closed.13 Article 44 of
the 1925 Chilean Constitution, still in place at the time the Amnesty Law was
decreed, and Article 60(16) of the dictatorship’s 1980 Constitution, both pro-
vided the state with legislative power to declare amnesty.14 The Court elevated
the Amnesty Law over other constitutional norms in place at the time of the
decision. Article 5(2), providing first that the sovereignty of the state was lim-
ited by rights emanating from human nature and second that organs of the
state have the duty to respect and promote those rights guaranteed by the
Constitution and by international treaties ratified by Chile,15 and Article 73,
regarding judicial authority (which included making determinations of crim-
inal culpability), did not disturb an amnesty law promulgated under the
powers of Article 60.16 The applicants had invoked common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions17 providing for fundamental protection of persons taking
no part or no longer an active part in hostilities in non-international armed
conflicts.18 The Supreme Court held common Article 3 to be inapplicable be-
cause the Court did not consider the period following the coup to be one of
an internal armed conflict. The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR)19 was not ratified until 1989, so rules against retrospectivity of
law prevented its application to cases originating in the 1970s.20 According to
the Court, the declaration of amnesty is a use of legislative power which sus-
pends a declaration of criminalityçessentially extinguishing the criminal
12 Iva¤ n Sergio Insunza Bascun‹ a¤ n, Corte Suprema de Justicia (‘Supreme Court’), Case No 27.640
(24 August 1990); LXXXVII Revista de Derecho y Jurisprudencia [Journal of Law and Justice]
Part 2, Section 4, 64 (1990). The case was affirmed on 28 September 1990.
13 Ibid. at paras 22^3.
14 Ibid. at paras 19^20. See Contreras, ‘La Amnist|¤ a en la Constitucio¤ n’ [Amnesty in the
Constitution] (1991) 18 Revista Chilena de Derecho [Chilean Journal of Law] 101 at 101^2.
15 The second part of this provision was included after 1989 reforms to the 1980 Constitution;
the distinction is discussed further below. Article 5(2) of the Constitucio¤ n Pol|¤ tica de la
Repu¤ blica de Chile de 1980 [1980 Constitution of the Republic of Chile] (‘1980 Constitution’)
(modified by Section 1, Law No 18.825 (17 August 1989)).
16 Insunza Bascun‹ a¤ n, supra n 12 at paras 22^3.
17 Third Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 1949, 75 UNTS 135;
and Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
1949, 75 UNTS 287.
18 See further Fleck, ‘The Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts’, in Fleck (ed.),The Handbook
of International Humanitarian Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) ch 12.
19 1966, 999 UNTS 171.
20 Insunza Bascun‹ a¤ n, supra n 12 at paras 26 and 28.
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character of an act. By implication, the Court considered the junta to be a legis-
lative power. Insunza Bascun‹ a¤ n essentially forestalled civil remedies as well;21al-
though the Court allowed that victims could pursue civil avenues, with no
official investigation to determine culpability such an action would fail.
The possibility of civil compensationwas ‘not only illusory but juridically impos-
sible’given the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Amnesty Law’s effect.22
B. Phase II (1998): The Turning Point
Lower appellate courts intermittently diverged from the Supreme Court ana-
lysis throughout the 1990s,23 but for many years the Supreme Court itself did
not deviate from finding the Amnesty Law constitutional. A clear indication
of jurisprudential change was not apparent until 1998,24 reflecting judicial
reform and ideological shifts in the Court.25 The series of accountability cases
decided in 1998 represent the second phase of post-dictatorship Supreme
Court jurisprudence on the Amnesty Law. Cases in that year demonstrate vola-
tility in what had been settled analysis and, ultimately, the Court held that ap-
plication of the Amnesty Law was unlawful and international law had
supremacy in the constitutional system.26 Findings in Poblete Co¤ rdova eventual-
ly became established doctrine in disappearance cases and the bedrock upon
which accountability jurisprudence was further developedçthe case repre-
sents a turning point, after which courts increasingly advanced rights
protection.27
The first of the Phase II cases, UribeTambley,28 revealed fissures in the Phase
I doctrine. The split decision (3:3, held in favour of the accused because of this
21 Norris, ‘Leyes de Impunidad y los Derechos Humanos en Las Ame¤ ricas: Una Respuesta Legal’
[‘Impunity Laws and Human Rights in the Americas: A Legal Response’] (1992) 15 Revista
IIDH [Journal Interamerican Institute for Human Rights] 47 at 55^6.
22 Case 10.843, Garay Hermosilla et al. v Chile Report No 36/96 (1996); 5 IHRR 816 (1997) at para
9.
23 Hilbink, supra n 1 at 195^8.
24 There are a few exceptions to this general trend, including a 4 September 1995 decision by
the Supreme Court allowing state agents to be questioned in relation to a disappearance
(Mar|¤ a Eugenia Mart|¤ nez Herna¤ ndez) and the 5 December 1995 confirmation of convictions
in a disappearance case (Juan Chequepan y Jose Llaulen). See Amnesty International, ‘Chile:
Transition at the Crossroads; Human Rights Violations under Pinochet Rule Remain the
Crux’, 6 March 1996, AI Index: AMR 22/001/1996 at 27, available at: http://www.amnesty
.org/en/library/info/AMR22/001/1996 [last accessed 23 November 2011].
25 These changes are discussed further in Section 3.
26 Poblete Co¤ rdova, Supreme Court, Case No 469-98 (9 September 1998).
27 Under an informal judicial rule, Supreme Court doctrine should be followed by lower courts
after two or three rulings. But the Supreme Court has said that its decisions are not binding
on subsequent decisions.Valenzuela, ‘Suprema dice que sentencias del pleno no son obligator-
ias’ [‘Supreme Court states that plenary decisions are not obligatory’], El Mercurio, 15 March
2008.
28 Ba¤ rbara Uribe Tambley y Edwin Francisco Van Yurick Altamirano, Supreme Court, Case No
973-97 (19 August 1998).
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division) rejected an appeal against the permanent suspension of a case by a
military tribunal through application of the Amnesty Law. The case focused
on two disappearances in 1974.29 The lead opinion found that the Amnesty
Law negated all effects of criminal action that had taken place and that such
legislation is permissible under domestic law for the sake of ‘social tranquil-
lity’.30 The opinion legitimised not only the laws of the junta but also argu-
ments it used to justify the law, finding that the declaration of a state of
siege31 was a preventative method intended to avoid a state of war.32 The dis-
senting opinion accepted that the Geneva Conventions, as international treaty
law ratified by Chile in 1950, had primacy in constitutional terms over the
Amnesty Law and that the investigation into the facts of the disappearances
should have been completed. Two key arguments were made. First, the domes-
tic penal code, which allowed for criminal responsibility to be extinguished in
certain circumstances, and the Amnesty Law itself required identification of a
responsible person. It was only possible to extinguish punishment, according-
ly, if such a determination had been made.33 Secondly, under Article 5 of the
Chilean Constitution, international treaties had pre-eminence over domestic
law, including constitutional law.34 The dissenters did not specify whether
they considered the Conventions, which obligate state parties to provide effect-
ive penal sanctions for grave breaches and bring those accused of such crimes
before courts,35 to require more than the establishment of the circumstances
surrounding disappearances.36
Many of the minority arguments in Uribe Tambley were echoed in the lead
opinion of Poblete Co¤ rdova,37 a 5:1 decision reflecting a new composition of the
Supreme Court.38 This was the first to reinstate for investigation a disappear-
ance case that had been dismissed by a military tribunal’s application of am-
nesty. The Court’s holding that domestic law required an investigation to
determine individual responsibility39 would have been sufficient to decide the
case.Yet, a majority of the Court also found for the first time that international
29 The disappearances had been the subject of an additional legal proceeding, closed by the
Supreme Court in 1995.
30 Uribe Tambley, supra n 28 at para 5 (lead opinion).
31 Decree Law No 3 (1973). The period was characterized as a state of war in Decree Law No 5
(1973).
32 Uribe Tambley, supra n 28 at paras 7^8 (lead opinion).
33 Ibid. at paras 1^6 (dissent).
34 Ibid. at para 10 (dissent).
35 For example, Articles 129^131 Third Geneva Convention 1949; and Articles 146^148 Fourth
Geneva Convention.
36 UribeTambley, supra n 28 at para10 (dissent). See also Paredes Barrientos, Supreme Court, Case
No 28^97 (20 August 1998).
37 Poblete Co¤ rdova, supra n 26.
38 Discussed further in Section 3.
39 Poblete Co¤ rdova, supra n 26 at paras 6^8 (majority).
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law in effect at the time of the disappearanceçhere, the Geneva
Conventionsçhad hierarchical superiority within the national legal order
and required investigation prior to application of the Amnesty Law.40 The
Court did not distinguish between the Constitution’s limitation on state sover-
eignty based on ‘rights emanating from human nature’ (the first part of
Article 5(2)) and the state’s duty to respect rights guaranteed by international
treaties41 (the second part of the provision, modified in 198942). The Court’s ap-
proachçto investigate crimes before applying amnestyçdid not explicitly go
beyond ‘the Aylwin Doctrine’ expressed seven years earlier by President
Patricio Aylwin. (He had promoted the principle that courts should investigate
cases to the point where the circumstances of the crime were known and crim-
inal responsibility established.43) As with other second-phase cases, the pro-
gressive judges on the Court indicated that the state’s obligations to provide
sanctions under the Geneva Conventions might be satisfied solely by investi-
gating the facts prior to application of the Amnesty Law.44 The majority did,
however, consider that the offence might fall outside the fixed dates of the
Amnesty Law, given that the whereabouts of the victim continued to be un-
known.45 The latter argument had been upheld previously by the Santiago
Court of Appeal and was further developed in subsequent case law.
The Court demonstrated a preference for founding decisions in domestic,
rather than international, law during Phase II. In a 4:2 judgment issued short-
ly after Poblete Co¤ rdova, the case of Contreras Maluje,46 the Court allowed an
appeal against a military court decision to dismiss a disappearance case, be-
cause new information had arisen through investigations undertaken by the
National Corporation for Reparation and Reconciliation. The Court found an
error in the application of domestic criminal law. Accordingly, it did not ana-
lyse arguments founded in constitutional and international law.47 Similarly, in
Barrios Duque48 the Supreme Court relied on domestic law to annul a high
military court decision dismissing the case.49 The facts had been the subject
of two proceedings raised in regular courts and transferred to military jurisdic-
tion; the Amnesty Law had been applied in the first case, and the military
40 Ibid. at paras 9^10 (majority) (citing common Article 3 and Articles 146 and 147; and Fourth
Geneva Convention, supra n 17).
41 Poblete Co¤ rdova, supra n 26 at paras 9-10 (majority).
42 See supra n 15.
43 Upon presenting the findings of the Commission on Truth and Reconciliation in a televised
address on 4 March 1991, President Aylwin expressed hope that courts would carry out
exhaustive investigations of human rights abuses ‘to which in my view, the 1978 Amnesty
Law is no obstacle’. See Amnesty International, supra n 24 at 17.
44 Poblete Co¤ rdova, supra n 26 at para 10 (majority).
45 Ibid. at para 11 (majority).
46 Supreme Court, Case No 292-97 (26 October 1998).
47 Ibid. at para 7 (majority).
48 Barrios Duque, Supreme Court, Case No 2.097-98 (29 December 1998).
49 Ibid. at para 14 (majority).
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court dismissed the second because the issues had been previously adjudi-
cated50 (‘res judicata’51). The Court found this to be in error. After an analysis
of the criminal procedure code and domestic law principles, it held that the
doctrine of res judicata in criminal matters requires common identity between
the subjects of the proceedings. In the first case, no individual had been pro-
cessed and, therefore, the res judicata argument failed.52
Throughout Phase II, the progressive opinions (that is, those, whether ma-
jority or dissenting, asserting that accountability cases should be reopened)
relied to an extent on dictatorship-era law and declined to challenge its valid-
ity. Judges did not reject the Amnesty Law outright, treating it as an effective
legal article. In Poblete Co¤ rdova, for example, the constitutionality of the
Amnesty Law was not put into doubt even when the Court recognised argu-
ments that evaded the law. When judges held that common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions was triggered, they invoked military decrees issued short-
ly after the coup to support the claim that an internal armed conflict existed
when the crime took place.53 At the end of Phase II, a critical stage in account-
ability jurisprudence and rights protection had been reached, but there was
minimal substantive change in Supreme Court decision-making. Poblete
Co¤ rdova was significant from a symbolic perspective (and in terms of its effect
in that case). Significantly, it was decided before Pinochet’s detention in
London in October 1998. But it did not necessarily require more than identifi-
cation of those responsible for human rights abuses. As a result, the wider
impact of the jurisprudence on lower courts was not immediately clear.
C. Phase III (1999^2007): A (Narrowly Defined) Rights Revolution
In Phase III, the Court consolidated protection of rights related to abuses from
the authoritarian era and significantly developed constitutional jurisprudence
on international law. Fundamental domestic law in effect and/or promulgated
during the dictatorship, including most significantly the 1980 Constitution
and criminal law rules and principles, generally continued to be applied with-
out assessment of its legality. But legislation deemed political in nature ^ the
Amnesty Law and certain military decrees ^ was increasingly identified as
invalid. In effect, the four cases discussed here54 demonstrate a sea change in
Supreme Court jurisprudence.
50 Ibid. at paras 2 and 5 (majority).
51 The doctrine of res judicata prevents an adjudicated issue from being the subject of a subse-
quent proceeding.
52 Barrios Duque, supra n 48 at paras 11 and 13.
53 See Uribe Tambley, Paredes Barrientos and Poblete Co¤ rdova.
54 Miguel A¤ ngel Sandoval, Supreme Court, Case No 517-04 (17 November 2004), 394 International
Law in Domestic Courts database (CL 2004); Diana Frida Aro¤ n Svigilsky, Supreme Court, Case
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In Sandoval, two military officers appealed sentences issued by the Santiago
Court of Appeal against them as principal and accomplice in a disappearance
case. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions unanimously, supporting the
Court of Appeal’s determination that the disappearance constituted the crime
of kidnapping under domestic law. Since it was not possible to determine
when the offence came to an end, the Amnesty Law and statutes of limitations
rules did not apply.55 On appeal, the applicants challenged the Court of
Appeal’s reliance on international treaties which were not in force at the time
of the initial detention.56 The Supreme Court dismissed this and other argu-
ments, finding that the lower court decision was based on domestic law that
was only ‘illustrated’ by the terms of international treaties.57 In a discussion
of the content of international human rights, the Court emphasised individual
freedom and recognised the ‘just and legitimate right to know the whereabouts
of those who have been detained’.58 The crime of kidnapping corresponded
with offences found in the Inter-American Convention on the Forced
Disappearance of Persons 1994.59 Thus, the Supreme Court illustrated its deci-
sion with international law that had not been ratified by Chile at the time of
the judgment.60 Notably, the Supreme Court dismissed the applicants’ argu-
ments that their crime was illegal detention rather than kidnapping,61 reveal-
ing an ideological view about the authoritarian government. Whereas illegal
detention would imply the functionary was acting in congruence with a regu-
lar system of procedure, albeit going beyond those boundaries, the Court as-
serted that there was no provision for the authorities ‘to detain people and
take them to clandestine detention centres, and even less to apply torture’.62
There was no indication that the victim had committed a crime, no appearance
before a tribunal and no relevant judicial or administrative order for the deten-
tion.63 Thus, the applicants’ attempt to frame their conduct in legal terms was
rejected. The Court presented a stronger argument than it had previously that
the military’s activities were unlawful, yet it still did not reject the Amnesty
Law outright.
No 3.215-05 (30 May 2006); Villa Grimaldi (Re Pinochet), Supreme Court, Case No 2.707-06
(3 October 2006); and Manuel Toma¤ s Rojas Fuentes, Case No 3.125-04 (13 March 2007), 1093
International Law in Domestic Courts database (CL 2007).
55 See, for example, Sandoval, supra n 54 at paras 27, 30 and 36^9. This approach, which con-
siders disappearances to continue unless unresolved is referred to here as the ‘ongoing crime
doctrine’.
56 Ibid. at paras 1, 9 and 10.
57 Ibid. at para 18.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid. at para 32.
60 The Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons (1994) 33 ILM 1529,
was signed by Chile in 1994 and entered into force in 1996, but was not ratified by Chile
until 2010.
61 Sandoval, supra n 54 at paras 19^24.
62 Ibid. at para 24.
63 Ibid. at para 20.
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Aro¤ n took a more expansive approach to rights protection than Sandoval, not
only solidifying the ongoing crime doctrine but also finding that Article 5 of
the Constitution was violated. The latter holding laid a foundation for subse-
quent convictions even when killings or torture had taken place within the
time of the Amnesty Law. In Aro¤ n, the Santiago Court of Appeal had applied
the Amnesty Law after the first instance court had convicted the defendants,
a reminder that fifteen years into the transition, not all courts evaded the
law.64 In its unanimous decision, the Supreme Court revoked the amnesty
application.65 First, the Court held that the crime of kidnapping is of a perman-
ent character when there is no evidence the victim was liberated or suffered
another consequence.66 Secondly, the Court found that, under Article 5,
domestic laws relating to statutes of limitations and amnesty must adhere to
constitutional limitations and international obligations.67 The crime was of an
international character and rights to effective remedies under the American
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)68 and the ICCPR69 prohibited amnesty
for such crimes; in consequence Article 5(2) was breached.70 By applying the
Amnesty Law, the Court of Appeal had committed an error of law.71 The
Supreme Court used a conflict of law analysis (identifying tension between
rights favouring victims and those protecting the accused) to hold that the
ACHR was applicable to the case despite ratification in 1990. ‘In a conflict of
this character, [courts] should favour the norms that best protect human
rights; this is the . . . spirit emanating from the Constitution.’72 In this case,
the Court recognised rights to truth and justice which overshadowed the doc-
trine against retroactive application of law adverse to defendants.73
The 2006 Villa Grimaldi case, in which the Supreme Court (8:4) affirmed a
Court of Appeal decision lifting Pinochet’s immunity to be investigated for the
alleged torture of several people in a secret detention centre, relied on a similar
conception of the constitutional framework. The majority determined that the
Chilean state generally and the courts in particular have an obligation to
64 The lead opinion in the Court of Appeal was written by a judge appointed during the
dictatorship.
65 Aro¤ n, supra n 54 at s IV.
66 Ibid. at s II, para 2.
67 Ibid. at s II, paras 3^4. The Court cited a 1995 company law case (Chilena de Fo¤ sforos S.A. v La
Comisio¤ n Nacional de Distorsiones de Precios de las Mercader|¤ as de Importacio¤ n, Supreme
Court, Case No 3396-94 (1995)) to support its analysis that, once incorporated into domestic
law, international treaties must be complied with in good faith under Articles 27 and 31 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, and that international
treaties have precedent over domestic law unless denounced by the Chilean state or no
longer internationally valid.
68 1969, 1144 UNTS 123, see Article 25.
69 See Article 2(3) ICCPR. The Court also referred to Article 15(2) ICCPR.
70 Aro¤ n, supra n 54 at s II, paras 4 and 5.
71 Ibid. at s II, para 5 (referring, in addition to Article 5, to Article 6, requiring bodies of the state
to act in conformity with the Constitution).
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
Dictatorship-era Crimes and the Chilean Supreme Court 89
 at Queens University of Belfast on June 26, 2013
http://hrlr.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
guarantee public security in times of war, including a duty to investigate and
punish those who commit international crimes, and this duty existed during
the authoritarian regime.74 Article 5 provided the primary basis for the su-
premacy of international responsibilities75 supported by other constitutional
principles and values, such as freedom of all persons and the state’s duties to
ensure security and promote the common welfare.76 According to the Court,
the history of Article 5 clearly established that core values are superior to any
norms promulgated by the state. The ‘supraconstitutional construction’ is
valid not because these values are found in international instruments but be-
cause they refer to fundamental rights.77 Conflict between internal and inter-
national law should be resolved in favour of that which most protects human
rights. The Court concluded that use of the Amnesty Law and statutes of limi-
tations must be rejected.78
The pool of international authorities deemed applicable toVilla Grimaldi was
particularly wide and, given that each authority pre-dated the relevant inci-
dents, allowed the Court to side-step the issue of retrospectivity. The Court
again held that common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Articles
146 and 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention required the state to guarantee
security during periods of internal armed conflict and bring those accused of
grave violations before domestic courts.79 This analysis, now internationally
accepted,80 had been contested in domestic courts throughout Latin America
in the 1990s.81 The prohibition of amnesty for grave violations of international
humanitarian law was implicit in the Court’s analysis. According to the
Court, principles such as these have become, moreover, jus cogens,82 which ‘all
the courts in all the world’ are obligated to apply.83 Chile’s membership of the
United Nations and historic support for international humanitarian law and
human rights law provided further justification for the Court’s conclusions.84
74 Villa Grimaldi, supra n 54 at paras 8^10.
75 Ibid. at para 13.
76 Ibid. at para 11 (citing a Constitutional Tribunal decision, Case No 21 (21 December 1987), at
paras 19^21). The Constitutional Tribunal made reference to, inter alia, Articles 1, 4, 5 and 19
of the 1980 Constitution.
77 Villa Grimaldi, supra n 54 at para 13. The Court cited as authority Constitutional Tribunal de-
cisions, a1996 Supreme Court judgment and expert opinions from sessions of the1974 consti-
tutional commission.
78 Ibid. at para 13 (citing nineteenth century lawyer and philosopher Andre¤ s Bello).
79 Ibid. at para 8.
80 Wolfrum and Fleck,‘Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law’ in Fleck, supra n18. On
divisions and synergy between international humanitarian law and human rights law, see
Arnold and Quenivet (eds) International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: Towards a
New Merger in International Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008).
81 Roht-Arriaza and Gibson, ‘The Developing Jurisprudence on Amnesty’ (1998) 20 Human
Rights Quarterly 843.
82 Jus cogens are fundamental principles of law recognised by the international community as
non-derogable.
83 Villa Grimaldi, supra n 54 at para 13.
84 Ibid. at paras 9 and 12.
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The Court even considered that a 1973 UN General Assembly resolution gov-
erning principles of international cooperation in the punishment of persons
culpable of war crimes and crimes against humanity was relevant to the
result.85 International instruments stemming from executive agreement with
outside bodies must be complied with,86 and states should of course conform
to treaties in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,87
requiring good faith observation of those instruments that have not been
renounced.88 Extensive citation of international judgments, including those
by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,89 also marked a distinction
from Phase II jurisprudence, as did the natural law arguments that pervaded
the decision.
The final development in Phase III case law is apparent in the Toma¤ s Rojas
case;90 despite the execution of the victim during the period of the Amnesty
Law, the Supreme Court overturned an appellate decision to dismiss the
case.91 The Court’s approach to constitutional law was not substantially differ-
ent from that apparent inVilla Grimaldi. Instead, the case is striking for its ana-
lysis of the political context and identification of legal illiberalism during the
dictatorship, an analysis with resonance beyond the legal realm.
The applicants had sought to reopen the case in part so that culpability by
superior military officers could be investigated; the victim had been killed
within a military camp in circumstances in which many were involved but
only one officer had been found responsible.92 The Court considered that
grave violations of the victim’s essential rights had occurred, which could be
considered crimes against humanity.93 It held that Articles 146 to 148 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention require not only investigation of such abuses, but
processing of offenders and the establishment of penal sanctions, and that am-
nesty is inapplicable in relation to these crimes while the Conventions have
domestic effect.94 In addition to relying heavily on the Geneva Conventions,
the case also avoided the principle of non-retrospectivity of criminal law by
finding that jus cogens principles recognised at the time of the victim’s death
also formed an integrated part of Chilean law via Article 5(2).95 In effect, the
85 Ibid. at para 9 (referring to GA Res 3074 (XXVIII), 3 December 1973, A/RES/3074 (XXVIII)).
86 Ibid. at para 12.
87 Supra n 67. See, for example, Article 27.
88 Villa Grimaldi, supra n 54 at paras 7^8 and 12.
89 For example,Vela¤ squez Rodr|¤ guez v Honduras IACtHR Series C 4 (1988); and Barrios Altos v
Peru IACtHR Series C 75 (2001); 10 IHRR 487 (2003).
90 Toma¤ s Rojas, supra n 54.
91 Two judges concurred in the result to re-open the investigation but still would have applied
the Amnesty Law upon completion of the investigation.
92 Toma¤ s Rojas, supra n 54 at paras 2(1) and 3(2).
93 Ibid. at para 26.
94 Ibid. at paras 16(2)-17 and 25.
95 Ibid. at para 31.
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Court held that both international treaty law and customary international law
aligned to prohibit violation of ‘rights emanating from human nature’.
Toma¤ s Rojas was therefore consistent with other Phase III cases in finding
that core international principles have constitutional pre-eminence over in-
ternal law.96 The judgment traced the foundation for Article 5(2) in recent con-
stitutional history (international law constituted a limitation on sovereignty
under the 1925 Constitution as well)97 and held that international instruments
related to essential rights have a higher constitutional rank than other trea-
ties.98 The Court noted that even a 1973 pronouncement by the authoritarian
Chilean government recognised the duty of courts to apply international
law.99 In the event of conflict between international and domestic law, courts
should assume that legislators did not intend to infringe international prin-
ciples and interpret domestic law accordingly.100 The Court made an even
stronger natural law argument than it had in Villa Grimaldi, quoting with
approval the proposition that the liberty of states to determine laws within
their territories cannot infringe a ‘certain nucleus of law in the conscience of
all civilised societies’.101
The most salient aspect of the Toma¤ s Rojas judgment is its assessment of the
illegality of certain dictatorship-era laws and recognition that ordinary courts
had failed to protect rights. The Court found that the military junta destroyed
the constitutional government of the time and established military jurisdic-
tion,102 accompanied by severe repression.103 The killing at issue in the case
took place in the context of systematic violations of human rights by state
agents; the person killed was a victim of a general policy to exile, detain, perse-
cute or execute citizens for ideological reasons or because they were suspected
of impeding the political goals of the junta.104 Conduct was actively concealed
from the ordinary courts.105 The peculiarity of the situation compelled the
Supreme Court of the time ‘to inhibit its intervention’ such that the autonomy
of military jurisdiction was maintained and oversight was located with the
military general in charge.106 In this context, those who benefited from the
state of war designation were bound by international humanitarian law and
96 Ibid. at paras 23, 31 and 35.
97 Ibid. at para 38.
98 Ibid. at para 39 (finding that the obligation to protect human rights is rooted not only in
Article 5 but also Articles 1 and 19, as well as international instruments).
99 Ibid. at para 36(4) (referring to a statement in an asylum case by an official of the Ministry of
External Relations).
100 Ibid. at para 36(3).
101 Ibid. at para 37 (citing Maurach and Zipf, Derecho Penal [Criminal Law], Bofill and Aimone
trans., 7th German edn (Editorial Astrea, 1994)).
102 Ibid. at para 6 (citing Decree Law Nos 3, 5, 640 and 641).
103 Ibid. at para 26(2).
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid. at para 8(2) (citing 1974 Supreme Court rulings).
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could not evade sanctions for transgressing them.107 Moreover, no state could
initiate procedures that were not subject to law or morality.108 Human rights
principles prohibited the use of amnesty for war crimes109 and self-exoneration
of criminal responsibility by perpetrators of grave violations.110 The Court
identified it as a ‘tragedy’ when the state uses law in an attempt to certify the
legality of immoral acts.111
A candid account of the establishment and conduct of the authoritarian
government had been routine in international tribunals during the Chilean
transition. For example, the unvarying approach of both the Inter-American
Commission and Inter-American Court was to consider not only the Amnesty
Law, but also the 1980 Constitution and other laws put into effect by the dicta-
torship, as invalid. The 1925 Constitution provided that laws not promulgated
by democratic means were null and void. The failure of the post-authoritarian
Chilean state to amend domestic law in accordance with relevant standards
and to investigate and prosecute human rights abuses provided the basis for
breaches of international law.112 In Toma¤ s Rojas, the criminal chamber of the
Supreme Court echoed this analysis. More generally a significant shift in
Supreme Court jurisprudence is demonstrated by the Phase III doctrine on
the primacy of international law, rooted not only in Article 5(2) of the 1980
Constitution but also in state obligations to protect essential rights found in
past constitutions and natural law.
D. Contradictory Decision-making
The broader picture of adherence to international standards in accountability
case law is more ambiguous. First, the Supreme Court deviated from these jur-
isprudential trends in individual cases through at least January 2010.113 In an
isolated case in 2009, for example, the criminal chamber of the Court found
that domestic statute of limitations rules prevented prosecution of a
107 Ibid. at para 13.
108 Ibid. at para 15.
109 As with other Phase III judgments, the Court considered that Article 6(5) of Additional
Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 (requiring authorities, at the end of hostilities, to endeavour
to grant the ‘broadest possible amnesty’ to persons who have participated in an internal
armed conflict) did not contemplate self-amnesty for violations of international crimes. See
Toma¤ s Rojas, supra n 54 at para 21(3).
110 Ibid. at paras 21(3) and 24^25.
111 Ibid. at para 37 (citing Maurach and Zipf, supra n 101).
112 Hermosilla v Chile, supra n 22; Cases 11.228, 11.229, 11.231 and 11.182, Meneses Reyes et al. v
Chile Report No 34/96 (1996); Case 11.725, Carmelo Soria Espinoza v Chile Report No 133/99
(1999); and Almonacid-Arellano et al. v Chile IACtHR Series C 154 (2006).
113 See, for example, a discussion of the use of statutes of limitations in human rights cases in
Human Rights Observatory, Bulletin No 8: Human Rights Trials in Chile and the Region
(Santiago: Universidad Diego Portales, July 2010) at 6, available at: http://www.icso.cl/
images/Paperss/bulletin_%208.pdf [last accessed 23 November 2011].
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disappearance case.114 Moreover, in recent years, the Court has routinely
applied a partial statutes of limitations formula to reduce sentences of
dictatorship-era human rights violators, resulting in minimal or conditional
sentences for many defendants.115 The decisions are based on a general provi-
sion of the Penal Code that requires judges to consider duration of time since
the offence as a mitigating factor in sentencing, even where the statute of limi-
tations has not been reached.116 But they are at variance with findings in
Phase III jurisprudence that statutes of limitations should not apply in cases
of gross human rights abuses. The Court’s calculations also have been incon-
sistent as to when statutes of limitations begin to run in disappearance
cases.117 The approach to sentencing differs by judge rather than being estab-
lished through a particular political compromise. Another obstacle to redress
for victims of gross human rights abuses is the use of statutes of limitations
rules to close civil actions. The civil law chamber of the Court has found, inter
alia, that the Geneva Conventions refer exclusively to criminal law and only
provide the basis for not applying statutes of limitations in criminal cases.118
These decisions, as well as delays in long-standing cases, temper the signifi-
cance of the developments identified in the previous section. Although the
overwhelming trend of the Supreme Court’s criminal chamber was toward pro-
tection of rights and in consequence there was general uniformity amongst
lower courts, lack of precedent allowed for divergence, underscoring ‘the fragil-
ity of the Supreme Court jurisprudence’.119
A second argument can be made that the Supreme Court’s doctrine on the
pre-eminence of international law, which could be a key legacy of accountabil-
ity case law applicable in other rights cases, is tenuous. In particular, questions
remain regarding whether or to what extent hierarchy of law differs depending
on the rights involved. Phase II cases increasingly had found international
treaties superior to domestic law through reliance on the second part of
Article 5(2), added in 1989, which recognises international law ratified by
Chile as a limitation on state sovereignty. The impact of these cases was tem-
pered by the Supreme Court’s findings that only the few treaties ratified at the
114 Carmen Binfa Contreras, Supreme Court, Case No 4329-08 (22 January 2009) at paras 4^11
(cited in Informe Anual sobre Derechos Humanos en Chile 2009 [Annual Report of Human
Rights in Chile 2009] 40 (Santiago: Centre of Human Rights, Ediciones Universidad Diego
Portales, 2009)). See also Annual Report of Human Rights in Chile 2008 472 (Santiago: Centre
of Human Rights, Ediciones Universidad Diego Portales, 2008).
115 Human Rights Observatory, Bulletin No 10: Human Rights Trials in Chile and the Region
(Santiago: Universidad Diego Portales, 2010); and Human Rights Observatory, Bulletin No. 11:
Human Rights Trials in Chile and the Region (Santiago: Universidad Diego Portales, 2011),
available at: http://www.icso.cl/observatorio-derechos-humanos/publicaciones-y-actividades/
[last accessed 23 November 2011]. See alsoAnnual Report of Human Rights in Chile 2009, ibid.
at 39.
116 Ibid. (citing Article 103 of the Chilean Penal Code).
117 Ibid. at 41^2.
118 Ibid. at 36.
119 Ibid. at 40.
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time of a disappearance could be applied in each case and the narrow inter-
pretation of the obligation to provide penal sanctions under the Geneva
Conventions. Still, Phase II cases created the potential for further development
of the doctrine in contemporary cases. In Sandoval, a broader base of interna-
tional law was invoked to support a decision founded in domestic law. The
case provides an example of domestic law being adapted to conform to interna-
tional standards without identification of that law as binding, a trend observed
in other contexts120 which also raised the potential for future expansion of
rights protection. Other Phase III cases moved beyond incremental adherence
to international norms and directly applied a wide spectrum of international
law and other sources. Their findings were not dependent on treaty ratifica-
tion; instead, the Supreme Court held that fundamental human rights are su-
perior to both international treaties and domestic law. The Court invoked the
spirit of the Constitution, constitutional history, and other state obligations to
support its view. But the Article 5(2) analysis was closely linked with the deter-
mination that jus cogens had been violated. It is quite likely that the Court’s ap-
proach would be different in respect to derogable rights. In addition, the
decisions turned on the severe and systematic conduct of the military. The doc-
trine is vulnerable to being distinguished in future cases where, for example,
the general social environment is not considered to be repressive.
In sum, at the end of Phase III, Amnesty Law doctrine was generally
uniform but the possibility of contradictory rulings remained. Despite the
innovative nature of the Supreme Court’s accountability jurisprudence, lower
courts were left without clear guidance on the appropriate use of judicial
discretion and the primacy of different forms of international law in rights
cases. (Lower courts apply Supreme Court doctrine regarding hierarchy of
law and the role of the judiciary, even if they are not bound to follow applica-
tions of law in individual cases.) Clarity regarding these fundamental prin-
ciples could have facilitated the development of rights jurisprudence more
generally. In addition, the context-specific decision-making in Phase III case
law limited its applicability in other cases.
3. Explaining Jurisprudential Change in Accountability
Case Law
Notwithstanding the weaknesses mentioned above, the jurisprudential shiftç
from loyalty to the authoritarian regime to a fierce defence of international
rightsçis striking for taking place in the post-dictatorship era without legisla-
tive change to the Amnesty Law. Between 1990 and 2007, the Chilean
120 See supra n 10 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court moved from upholding the law at the onset of an investigation,
without assessing its lawfulness or the validity of claims, to tentative evasion
of the law and eventual rejection of it. The most salient explanation for the
change was constitutional reform of the Supreme Court in late 1997, although
the resulting modification to the composition of the Court does not wholly ac-
count for the timing and degree of Phase III developments. This section first
summarises judicial reform during the period,121 which partially explains the
shift from Phase I to Phase II case law. It then considers explanations for
change in judicial politics literature and outlines a number of political factors
that resulted in the conservative Supreme Court expanding rights protection
in these cases. Finally, it is argued that the jurisprudence is an indicator of
the surprisingly significant role that judicial autonomy plays in the Chilean
legal system.
A. Judicial Reform
Prior to the democratic transition, Pinochet attempted to ensure a long-lasting
judiciary supportive of the military regime by appointing a younger cohort of
Supreme Court justices. To this end, he enacted legislation in 1989 providing fi-
nancial encouragement for Supreme Court justices over the age of 75 years to
retire122 and appointed seven new justices out of a total of 17 before leaving
office in 1990,123 taken from a list of candidates proposed by the Court as
required by the Constitution.124 Attempts at judicial reform in the early years
of the transition were largely unsuccessful,125 except that legislation taking
effect in 1995 divided the Court into separate chambers that allowed human
rights cases to be heard in a particular penal chamber.126 The most significant
development relevant to the issues covered here was a modification of the ap-
pointment process by constitutional amendment in 1997 which, inter alia,
(i) provided that the Supreme Court be composed of 21 justices; (ii) required
agreement by the Senate to each appointment; (iii) mandated that at least five
members of the Court should be lawyers outside of the judiciary; and (iv)
121 The significant issue of ongoing military jurisdiction over matters involving the military and
police is beyond the scope of this article. See Pereira and Zaverucha, ‘The Neglected
Stepchild: Military Justice and Democratic Transition in Chile’ (2005) 32 Social Justice 115.
122 Decree Law No 18.805 (17 June 1989).
123 Hilbink, supra n 1 at 159.
124 Article 75, 1980 Constitution.
125 Hilbink, supra n 1 at 182^3 and 185; and Barahona de Brito, Human Rights and
Democratization in Latin America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) at 175. See also
Fuenzalida Faivovich, ‘Law and Legal Culture in Chile, 1974-1999’, in Friedman and
Pe¤ rez-Perdomo (eds), Legal Culture in the Age of Globalization (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2003) at 119.
126 Law No 19.374, Diario Oficial [Official Journal] (3 February 1995), available at: http://www.
anfitrion.cl/actualidad/20ulle/19374.html [last accessed 23 November 2011].
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facilitated the retirement of sitting justices over age 75 years.127 Accordingly,11
new members of the Court were appointed in 1998.128 Five of those were
non-judicial lawyers, marking a significant break from the ‘closed, autonomous
bureaucracy’129 of Chile’s established judiciary.
Additional judicial and legal reforms arguably have had minimal bearing on
accountability case law. For example, a dramatic change in the Chilean crim-
inal justice process was set in motion in the late 1990s and rolled out through
2005130çincluding a shift to adversarial penal procedure, the establishment
of Public Prosecutor and Public Defender’s offices, and reform of the penal
code. But cases filed under the old system were not transferred to the new
system, and the timing of the reforms limited the effect on past cases.131
Indeed, penal reform did not directly impact on any of the cases covered here.
Similarly, constitutional amendments affecting the Constitutional Tribunal
have not resulted in that institution weighing in on accountability issues. A
quasi-judicial body which had existed under the Allende administration, the
Constitutional Tribunal was revived by the dictatorship in the 1980
Constitution.132 Those amendments gave the Tribunal power to review the
constitutionality of proposed legislation and government decrees.133 It was
not until 2005 that the Tribunal’s power was expanded to include jurisdiction
127 Law No 19.541, Official Journal (22 December 1997) (modifying in relevant part Article 75,
1980 Constitution), available at: http://natlaw.com/interam/ar/ga/st/starga51.htm [last
accessed 23 November 2011].
128 Hilbink, supra n 1 at 187.
129 Ibid. at 214. Dezalay and Garth describe the Chilean judiciary as traditionally ‘part of an
extended familial network’ traceable to the old oligarchy: see The Internationalization of
PalaceWars: Lawyers, Economists and the Contest to Transform Latin American States (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2002) at 223.
130 See Blanco, Hutt and Rojas, ‘Reform to the Criminal Justice System in Chile: Evaluation and
Challenges’ (2004) 2 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review 253; and Riego,
‘Introduccio¤ n de Procedimientos Orales en Chile’ [Introduction to Oral Proceedings in Chile]
(Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006) at 1^9, available at: http://www.csis
.org/media/csis/events/060607_judicial_riego.pdf [last accessed 23 November 2011].
131 Blanco, supra n 130 at 260. The reforms were implemented in five stages beginning in two
regions in 2000, with the final stage initiated in the Santiago metropolitan area (home to
approximately one-third of Chile’s population) in 2005: see Riego, supra n 130 at 5.
132 Article 81. The Constitutional Tribunal was comprised of seven members who served
eight-year terms. Three Supreme Court judges were elected to the panel by that court and
one lawyer was appointed by the President, two by the National Security Council (an entity
controlled by the junta during the dictatorship and dominated by the military into the transi-
tion) and one by the Senate (prior to the transition, by the junta). See Article 81 1980
Constitution and transitory provisions 9, 21(b) and 25.
133 Article 82. Paradoxically, despite the prevalence of military appointees on its panel during the
dictatorship, the Constitutional Tribunal found against the regime in a ruling that was in-
strumental in the fair running of the 1988 plebiscite on Pinochet’s presidency and the result-
ant election of a democratic government in 1989. Hilbink, ‘Agents of Anti-Politics: Courts in
Pinochet’s Chile’, in Ginsburg and Moustafa (eds), Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in
Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 111^2; and Barros,
Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta and the 1980 Constitution (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002) at 257.
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to review the constitutionality of existing laws as applied in individual
cases,134 previously the purview of the Supreme Court. This and other re-
forms135 are set to alter the juridical/political dynamic in coming years,136 but
the Tribunal has not considered the constitutionality of the Amnesty Law.
In institutional and normative terms, Chile has the potential to join the
global trend of judicialisation, most notably as a result of the re-invigoration
of the Constitutional Tribunal137 and ratification and application of interna-
tional human rights law. (Scholars have identified a shift toward judicialisation
of politics, in which courts have become ‘powerful institutional actors or
policy-makers’as a result of the establishment of new or stronger constitutions,
expanded use of judicial review, and/or incorporation of international human
rights law.138) Judicial reform during the period of transition did not, however,
translate into a significant policy-making role by the traditional judiciary or
members of the Constitutional Court. In 2005, Couso documented a low level
of judicialisation in Chile, concluding that constitutional adjudication signified
‘a ‘‘rights revolution’’ that never happened’.139 The Constitutional Tribunal, con-
sidered key to the consolidation of democracy, failed to increase protection of
human rights or judicial control over policymaking, and the Supreme Court’s
record was one of deference to the executive.140 Recent decision-making by
the Constitutional Tribunal indicates a shift is underway. According to Couso
and Hilbink, its policy role increased dramatically in 2008, which they
attribute in part to institutional reforms as well as changes to the composition
134 Article 93, 1980 Constitution (including 2005 reforms amending former Article 82; Law No
20.050, Official Journal (18 August 2005), available at: http://www.anfitrion.cl/actualidad/
20ulle/20050.html [last accessed 23 November 2011]).
135 The 2005 reforms also increased the composition of the Tribunal to 10 membersçthree
elected by the Supreme Court, three by the President and four by Congressçand their
tenure to nine years and prohibited extracurricular legal and judicial activity so that there
are no longer part-time members. See Article 92, 1980 Constitution.
136 Hammergren contends, however, that restricted access to constitutional tribunals in Chile
and other Latin American countries limits conflict between those tribunals and supreme
courts: see Hammergren, Envisioning Reform: Improving Judicial Performance in Latin America
(University Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 2007) at 186.
137 Montes and Vial, The Role of Constitution-Building Processes in Democratization (Stockholm:
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2005) at 29, available at:
http://www.idea.int/cbp/upload/CBP-Chile.pdf [last accessed 23 November 2011] (finding
that Chile’s political structure would constitute an acceptable model incorporating ‘constitu-
tional justice similar in its composition to the European model’ at least on paper, assuming
approval of the 2005 constitutional reforms).
138 See Shapiro and Stone, ‘The New Constitutional Politics of Europe’ (1994) 26 Comparative
Political Studies 197; Tate and Vallinder (eds), The Global Expansion of Political Power (New
York: New York University Press, 1995); and Shapiro and Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics and
Judicialization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
139 Couso, supra n 11 at 123. See also Couso, ‘The Politics of Judicial Review in Chile in the Era of
Democratic Transition, 1990-2002’ (2003) 10 Democratization 70.
140 Couso, supra n 11. See also Hilbink, supra n 1.
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of the Tribunal.141 Interestingly, the authors discount the impact that compos-
itional change to the Supreme Court has had on a process of judicialisation
that may be developing in the ordinary courts, instead attributing it to modifi-
cations that have affected lower-court judges (in relation to training and
salary, criminal procedure and their ability to raise constitutional issues
before the Constitutional Tribunal).142 In effect, activism has been identified
in the Constitutional Tribunal and lower courts,143 both of which are now less
subject to direct and indirect Supreme Court control. A new intellectual envir-
onment that encourages judicial activism and development of constitutional
law, particularly in the realm of rights protection, is also an influence on all
courts.144 This ideological shift may have affected the Supreme Court’s Phase
III jurisprudence discussed here, even if the institutional reform that Couso
and Hilbink identify did not. Even so, it must be emphasised that the wider
picture of Supreme Court conservatism places Phase III Amnesty Law juris-
prudence in sharp relief, representing a counter-trend in rights protection.
B. Political Influences on Judicial Decision-making
Given the limited impact of reform projects on accountability case law, studies
of judicial actors are particularly resonant in the Chilean context. Hilbink
argues that the judiciary maintained passivity during the post-dictatorship
era due to historic institutional norms;145 in a study that covers case law up
to 2000, she attributes shifts in Amnesty Law jurisprudence to the personnel
changes in 1997 and 1998 and transnational pressure.146 Comparing account-
ability case law to that related to post-authoritarian rights issues, Hilbink
finds that, in the latter cases, the judiciary either neglected to apply constitu-
tional analyses or was as likely to limit constitutionalist principles as to
uphold them.147 Accountability case law adhered to dominant jurisprudential
trends during Phase I and began to diverge from the Court’s conservative ten-
dency in Phase II. (It is clear that Phase III case law, not considered in
Hilbink’s text, continued this trend.) Jurisprudential change has also been
attributed to judicial ideology. In a study based on interviews of Chilean
141 Couso and Hilbink, ‘From Quietism to Incipient Activism: The Institutional and Ideological
Roots of Rights Adjudication in Chile’, in Helmke and R|¤os-Figueroa (eds), Courts in Latin
America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) at 110.
142 Ibid. at 107^10.
143 Ibid. at 109 and 110.
144 Couso, supra n 8 at 149.
145 See, for example, supra n 23 at 208.
146 Ibid. at 198 and 208.
147 Ibid. at 203.
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judges at all levels, Huneeus argues that a significant judicial motivator in
Pinochet-era cases was the attempt to atone for judicial complicity in human
rights abuses during the dictatorship.148 The analysis seeks to explain the
surge in prosecutions by lower courts rather than Supreme Court activity, con-
tending that increased public scrutiny of these cases provided an opportunity
in which Supreme Court power over lower courts was checked.149 Collins
places emphasis on the role of human rights advocates, lawyers, and victims
in initiating and strategically pursuing claims, although she acknowledges
that the shift in accountability activity should be attributed to a combination
of factors including gradual democratisation and judicial change.150 Direct
access of legal representatives to magistrates facilitated investigations; legal
and political strategies of advocates promoted results.151
These studies address institutional custom, judicial culture and the conduct
of private actors affecting judicial decision-making in Chile during the transi-
tional and post-transitional periods. More narrowly, they help to explain the
shift in accountability jurisprudence identified in Section 2 of this article and
why results in these cases differed from those in non-accountability case law.
In sum, modifications to the composition of the Supreme Court and its special-
isation into chambers provided an opportunity for change which was taken
upçalbeit inconsistentlyçin response to ongoing demands by victims and
relatives and internal and external pressure.
The influence of the international Pinochet caseçdirectly on the courts and
indirectly by way of the Chilean public and international actorsçmay not be
quantifiable but pervades the Chilean human rights story from the late 1990s.
The details regarding Pinochet’s return to Chile and efforts to prosecute him
have been well documented.152 It is worth emphasising that Phase II case law
demonstrates a process of change in human rights jurisprudence in Chile
prior to Pinochet’s arrest in London. That process gained momentum during
his detention from 1998 to 2000 and accelerated a number of years after his
release. The timing and degree of change in Phase III case law can be most
readily understood when viewed alongside domestic and international political
events which include those involving Pinochet.
In effect, in the 2000sçmore than 10 years after the start of the transi-
tionçthe political consequences of sustaining claims against past human
rights violators had receded and the risks of judicial apathy had increased for
several reasons. First, accountability issues were no longer as politically
charged as they had been in the 1990s. Public perception about the dictator-
ship had changed. Both Pinochet’s detention and claims against the Pinochet
148 Huneeus, supra n 4 at 114^24.
149 Ibid. at 105 and 111.
150 See supra n 5 at 83-4.
151 Ibid. at fn 7 and 76^8.
152 See, for example, Roht-Arriaza, supra n 1; and Burbach, supra n 1.
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family for financial crimes (beginning in 2004) had diminished his loyal sup-
port base in the political right. The military acknowledged the policy of dis-
appearing opponents of the regime in early 2001, former officers had
confessed (in court or through the media) for egregious crimes, and in 2003
President Lagos issued a formal apology for torture and other abuses. As a
result, even supporters of the dictatorship no longer denied that violations
had taken place. The risk of a military backlash against judicial
decision-making was gone (and dozens of generals had retired in the late
1990s153) but conversely public interest in justice for past crimes had less-
ened.154 Although the overall legacy of the dictatorship was still socially div-
isive in Chile, claims regarding contemporary rights abuses against the
democratic governments were arguably more controversial than past cases.
Secondly, the judiciary’s political position was propitious to divergence from
past conservatism in accountability case law. The formal political power of the
military had been reduced when Pinochet’s term as Commander in Chief
ended in 1998,155 and judicial reform (from the late 1990s through 2005)
encouraged judicial autonomy alongside an emerging legal culture that
favoured the recognition of constitutional rights.156 These changes did not
translate into greater rights protection by the Supreme Court in a general
sense, but, in combination with an unusual form of pressure from the govern-
ment, it became more difficult for the Supreme Court to sustain use of the
Amnesty Law in the face of ongoing claims by private parties. The commitment
of the government to results in accountability case law can be questioned,157
but its uniform message on the global stage was to challenge impunity and
promote the use of domestic courts. (In addition, at the domestic level, from
the late 1990s the Ministerio Pu¤ blico158 rejected application of the Amnesty
Law and supported continued investigation of cases.159) The Chilean govern-
ment’s position before the Inter-American bodies provides an example. It
argued that it could not revoke the Amnesty Law given the constitutionally
based legislative process and that it was obligated to protect judicial independ-
ence even where, as in the Insunza case, it disagreed with the Supreme Court’s
153 Requa, supra n 1 at 91.
154 Collins, supra n 5 at 75, fn 38 (citing poll data compiled in Huneeus, Chile, Un Pa|¤ s Dividido
[Chile: A Country Divided] (Santiago: Catalonia, 2003)).
155 Requa, supra n 1 at 91.
156 Couso, supra n 8 at 149.
157 There have been several indications of successive governments’ reticence to promote account-
ability. For example, the Frei and Lagos administrations made attempts to restrict prosecu-
tions for human rights abuses, and the Bachelet administration nominated pro-impunity
judges to the Supreme Court. Muted efforts to repeal the Amnesty Law were never sustained.
158 The Office of the Public Prosecutor.
159 See, for example, Contreras Maluje, supra n 46 at para 13 (majority). It does not appear that
the current conservative administration has diverged from this policy. See ‘Gobierno apelara¤
a dictamen de la Suprema que rechazo¤ reabrir caso Soria’ [‘Government to appeal Supreme
Court ruling that rejected reopening of the Soria case’], EFE, 31March 2010; and ‘Chile presi-
dent rules out pardon for military abuses’, BBC, 25 July 2010.
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decision. Yet it declared the Amnesty Law to be legally void and, as the
transition endured, became more forthright in its condemnation of military
abuses. Similarly, successive governments opposed the Amnesty Law in
various international fora.160 Most famously, the prospect of domestic trials
was invoked by the government in attempts to secure Pinochet’s return from
the UK. This internationally mediated pressure on the judiciary was
augmented by the censure of the Chilean judiciary by global actors and
institutions.161 Reproach of the Supreme Court by the Inter-American
bodies culminated in the Inter-American Court’s 2006 finding162 that the
Chilean state, including the judiciary, continued to be in contravention of the
ACHR.163
The Supreme Court’s Phase II doctrine fell short of the standards advocated
by the government and international bodies. Moreover, the Court’s adherence
to a conservative conception of the role of the judiciary (as one that applies
rather than interprets law) was incongruous with international norms with
respect to the prosecution of gross human rights violations. The attention
drawn to Chilean justice claims during Pinochet’s detention, and the govern-
ment’s promises that the Chilean courts were able to decide the cases fairly,
subjected accountability jurisprudence in particular to domestic and interna-
tional scrutiny. In consequence, the Supreme Court was encouraged to take a
progressive stance in these high-profile cases.
In its Phase III case law, the Supreme Court went beyond what was legally
necessary to decide the claims in favour of victims and their families, invoking
an array of international authorities and norms. Although not easy to conclu-
sively determine, international pressure provides a plausible explanation for
the Court’s new approach. After the Amnesty Law was held contrary to inter-
national law by the Inter-American Court in Almonacid-Arellano164 and
then-President Michelle Bachelet vowed to repeal the law, the president of
the Chilean Supreme Court stated publicly that Inter-American Court judg-
ments are not binding on domestic courts (and it was not possible to re-open
160 According to the Lagos administration, ‘[s]ince March 1990, the democratic Governments
have considered the Amnesty Decree-Law to be unlawful’. Human Rights Committee,
Consideration of Reports submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant: Fifth
Periodic Report: Chile, 5 July 2006, CCPR/C/CHL/5 at para 1. See also, in respect to the
Bachelet administration, Gallardo, ‘Chile Leader Visits Site of Her Torture’, The Associated
Press, 14 October 2006.
161 Sikkink considers that dynamics such as these create political opportunities, whereby efforts
of activists can have a greater impact on domestic institutions in relation to (for example)
the use of international human rights law. See Sikkink, ‘The Transnational Dimension of the
Judicialization of Politics in Latin America’, in Sieder et al., supra n 11 at 263^89.
162 Almonacid-Arellano v Chile, supra n 112.
163 Supra n 68.
164 Almonacid-Arellano v Chile, supra n 112.
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adjudicated cases).165 Nonetheless, two months after the decision, the Supreme
Court decided Villa Grimaldi, which went beyond the early Phase III cases in
terms of rights protection. That case, as well as Toma¤ s Rojas five months later,
was more closely aligned to Inter-American Court jurisprudence on amnesty
laws and past human rights violations than any previous Supreme Court case
even though Almonacid itself was not directly followed.
C. Judicial Autonomy
Chile’s historically civil law system is undergoing reform in a number of realms,
with the introduction (for example) of adversarial features to criminal proced-
ure and the increasing recognition that courts should not merely apply but
interpret legislation.166 Chilean legal culture may be experiencing change,
with a new acceptance of judicial independence, but the narrowly drawn
decision-making in accountability case law indicates that the Supreme Court
was not attempting to use the docket to broaden its powers more generally.
Instead, international and domestic pressure in regard to past human rights
violations had an impact on a court thatçdespite personnel changesç
remains conservative. Notwithstanding the reactive and issue-specific analysis
that was employed in Phase III case law, the Supreme Court asserted its
authority to determine the position and content of human rights law in the
Chilean system. The jurisprudence also demonstrated the importance of
judge-made law in the predominantly civil system167 and jurisprudence
constante, whereby decisions are not binding on subsequent courts but have
‘mature[d] into a prevailing line of precedents’.168 The Court referred to its
own doctrine on Article 5 of the Constitution as precedent, developed rules
related to hierarchy of law, and invoked a wide variety of authorities to find
the Amnesty Law invalid. The case law therefore aligns with broader legal
trends if not the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on other matters.
Section 2 of this article identified gaps and contradictions in the jurispru-
dence, but nonetheless the case law demonstrates significant judicial auton-
omy to resolve human rights issues. Interestingly, the Court relied on not only
its constitutional authority to decide the claims but also more general powers
165 ‘Suprema no reabrira¤ caso amnistiado pese a fallo de la Corte Interamericana’ [‘Supreme
Court will not reopen amnestied case despite Inter-American Court judgment’], La Nacio¤ n,
17 October 2006.
166 Blanco, supra n 130; Riego, supra n 130; and Couso, supra n 8. On the exportation of US and
German legal cultures to Chile, see Cooper, ‘Competing Legal Cultures and Legal Reform:
The Battle of Chile’ (2008) 29 Michigan Journal of International Law 501.
167 On judicial lawmaking in civil law systems, see Vranken, Fundamentals of European Civil Law
(Sydney: The Federation Press, 1997) at 62^6; and Merryman and Pe¤ rez-Perdomo, The Civil
LawTradition, 3rd edn (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007) ch 7.
168 Fon, Parisi and Depoorter, ‘Litigation, Judicial Path-Dependence and Legal Change’ (2005)
European Journal of Law and Economics 43.
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that transcended the 1980 Constitution. Protection of rights, it seems, is a duty
of the Court rooted in the country’s twentieth century constitutional history
and values upon which the political system is based. In Phase III case law, the
Supreme Court resolved Article 5’s ambiguity in favour of the primacy of inter-
national law. But its fact-specific analysis, identifying the rights at issue as ‘es-
sential’, allows the Court to decline to apply international law in future
matters, maintaining a zone of discretion169 to determine the relevance of
Article 5. In conjunction with its power to determine the content of rights
and conflicts of law, the Supreme Court can readily diverge from doctrine
established in accountability case law. Still, the jurisprudence supports
the rights-based approach that many lower courts have taken and provides
an invitation to human rights advocates to pursue claims on other issues.
4. Conclusion
This article has explored the sea change in Chilean Supreme Court account-
ability jurisprudence in recent years, from routine recognition of the
Amnesty Law in the first decade of democracy to its rejection in the
mid-2000s. During Phase II, the Court began to evade the law but declined to
conclusively alter established doctrine, which continued to lend legitimacy to
dictatorship-era norms. Phase III represented a watershed in many respects:
in Sandoval, the Supreme Court officially acknowledged abuses committed by
the military regime; in Aro¤ n, Villa Grimaldi and Toma¤ s Rojas the Court
renounced use of amnesty and statutes of limitations for international crimes
and presented a fundamentally different view of the internal legal order, prior-
itising human rights law. The Court considered that judicial obligations to
guarantee individual rights are rooted in the Constitution, international law
and principles that transcend positive law. The case law could be viewed as
politically assertive except that domestic and international pressure on the
Court facilitated the dramatic shift. It has been contended in this article, how-
ever, that accountability jurisprudence remains unstable. The manner in
which constitutional doctrine was developed maximises the Court’s discretion
and provides significant opportunity for the invocation of international law
by advocates and other courts but also the anticipation of continued inconsist-
ent results in rights cases. The groundwork has been laid for the Court to di-
verge from its traditional deferential role in the political system, yet social and
political factors seem set to remain a significant influence on decision-making.
169 The phrase is from Krisch, used in the context of the pluralism of the European human rights
regime. See Krisch, ‘The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law’ (2008) 71
Modern Law Review 183 at 215.
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A final point can be made about the failure of successive governments to
ensure justice for victims of human rights abuses. The point is not that govern-
ment should have intervened in individual court proceedings, which would
violate separation of powers principles, but that the lack of legislative and judi-
cial reform on human rights matters impeded the ability of courts to resolve
the issues. Accountability claims were not included in the political settlement
that ended the dictatorship, an understandable outcome given fear that the
peace process could be easily derailed. Retributive approaches were not
encouraged in the early years of the transition in consideration of the mili-
tary’s enduring strength.170 But nor has there been a focused political effort to
deal with such legacy issues in the years since, in contrast to Chile’s claims
internationally. Constitutional and judicial reform (which had minimum
impact on past cases, other than to alter the composition of the Supreme
Court) was distinguished from initiatives to address abuses of the dictatorship,
which concentrated on truth processes and reparations programmes.171 These
schemes did not make determinations of responsibility or provide restoration
in individual cases other than to provide financial compensation to victims
and their families. Arguably, the governments benefitted from the ambiguity
and distance provided by struggling court processes, which allowed them to
avoid controversial policymaking in the name of judicial independence.
Political leaders have avoided specific policy proposals regarding human
rights abuses. The constancy of certain legal rules at the centre of developing
jurisprudence is striking and underscores the extent to which change
stemmed from the courts. Most notably, the dictator’s Amnesty Law has not
been repealed by Chile’s Congress. Laws applicable in regular criminal cases
(related to statutes of limitations, non-retrospectivity of law, double jeopardy
and transfer and suspension of cases, for example) were not altered to ad-
dressçor even conversely prohibit application toçgross human rights viola-
tions. The judiciary has been compelled to adapt ordinary criminal procedure
to now decades-old cases of systematic abuse by state agents that raise distinct
legal issues. Sentencing law is another area where legislative activity would
have been appropriate; inconsistent decision-making continues to be an issue.
The position of international law in the constitutional system also remains am-
biguous, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Article 5 in
Phase III case law. This is ripe for legislative resolution, through ordinary law
170 Portales, Chile: Una Democracia Tutelada [Chile: A Protected Democracy] (Santiago: Editorial
Sudamericana Chilena, 2000).
171 Truth processes include the Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (established in May
1990; report issued February 1991); the National Corporation for Reparation and
Reconciliation (established in January 1992 to oversee the reparations programme and con-
tinue investigations of the CTR); Mesa de Dia¤ logo [Roundtable Discussions] (established in
June 2000 to determine the whereabouts and information related to disappeared persons);
and the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture (established in August
2003; reports issued in November 2004 and June 2005).
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or constitutional amendment. Finally, in the absence of binding precedent,
legislation could have been introduced to ensure consistent interpretation of
fundamental human rights law. Any change to precedential rules arguably
should be made by legislators, and indeed the judiciary has deemed it inappro-
priate to act on the issue. (The Supreme Court commissioned an internal
study which found that its decisions were not legally binding in subsequent
cases because (i) the civil code stipulates that decisions only have effect in the
immediate case and (ii) precedent would counter judicial independence.172)
Although the lack of binding precedent is not problematic in itself,173 it was a
significant barrier to consolidation of the anti-impunity surge in Chilean case
law, resulting in contradictory conclusions in similarly situated cases and pro-
longed appeals. In sum, the slow pace of change and inconsistency in account-
ability jurisprudence reflects these obstacles as well as judicial ideology.
Political leaders failed to provide courts with the legal tools to comprehensively
address egregious crimes of the past.
The reticence of politicians to act conclusively to promote (or alternatively
prevent) human rights trials impeded and prolonged court processes and par-
tially accounts for variable and creative judicial doctrine. This argument is a re-
minder that the role of executives and legislatures, with respect to retributive
accountability as part of ‘post-transitional justice’, should not be discounted.174
In Chile, during and after the transition to democracy, private actors attempted
to resolve justice issues through court processes; they have been successful re-
centlyçdespite challenges that accompany the passage of timeçbecause the
political climate is less hostile to such claims. But consistent and comprehen-
sive accountability requires sustained political engagement as well, which
was lacking in Chile and has not been taken up in the recent period.
Arguably, governments and legislatures should play a key role in negotiations
related to human rights violations of previous regimes; in Chile at this late
date, politicians should act to address irregularities in the application of
human rights law and in sentencing matters, however unpopular the topic.
Legal reform related to the domestic position of international law would pro-
mote consistency between past and contemporary rights issues and improve
protection of rights more generally in Chile.
172 See Valenzuela, supra n 27.
173 See Merryman, supra n 168.
174 Recent scholarship has identified the theory and practice of post-transitional justice and con-
ceptualised the role of the state as diminishedçin respect to dealing with past human
rights abusesçwhen compared to the period of transition. See, for example, Collins, supra n
4 at 34^5; and Skaar, supra n 4 at ch 2.
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